Abstract: Empirical evidence suggests that prices do not always reflect fundamental values and individual behavior is often inconsistent with rational expectations theory. We report the results of fourteen experimental markets designed to examine whether the interactive effect of subject pool and design experience tempers price bubbles and improves forecasting ability. Our main findings are: (i) price run-ups are modest and dissipate quickly when traders are knowledgeable about financial markets and have design experience; (ii) price bubbles moderate quickly when only a subset of traders are knowledgeable and experienced; and (iii) individual forecasts of price are not consistent with the predictions of the rational expectations model in any market.
THE EFFECTS OF SUBJECT POOL AND DESIGN EXPERIENCE ON RATIONALITY IN EXPERIMENTAL ASSET MARKETS
Models of economic behavior are commonly based on the assumption that aggregate behavior is rational. Yet empirical evidence suggests that asset prices do not always reflect fundamental values. The Dutch tulipmania (Kindleberger 1989) and observed large premia in closed-end country funds (Ahmed, Koppl, Rosser, and White 1997) provide specific examples of extreme market price adjustments, which may be interpreted as mispricing. Additional evidence is 1 provided by experimental bubbles markets, which report price run ups followed by crashes relative to fundamental value. Experimental studies have attempted to identify factors that mitigate price bubbles, including design experience, margin buying, futures markets, price limits, and short sales (Smith, Suchanek, and Williams 1988; King, Smith, Williams, and Van Boening 1993; Porter and Smith 1995) . Only design experience consistently tempers price bubbles. 2 Researchers also have found that individuals' forecasts of market price are inconsistent with rational expectations theory. Empirical evidence suggests that forecasts are biased and serially correlated and that the formation of price expectations can be described as adaptive (Williams 1987; Smith, Suchanek, and Williams 1988; Peterson 1993) . Moreover, forecast accuracy does not appear to improve with design experience. This paper reports the results of 14 experimental bubbles markets designed to examine the effects of subject pool and design experience on market price deviations from fundamental value and individual forecasting behavior. Subjects from different pools bring divergent knowledge sets to the experiment --specifically, what is known about the workings of financial markets.
Subjects' knowledge sets may affect the rate at which they learn to transact effectively in our experimental markets (i.e., to exploit profitable trading opportunities) and develop an understanding of the fundamental determinants of asset value. If differences are observed across subject pools, accurate modeling of behavior may require more attention to agent-specific characteristics (Ball and Cech 1996) . In addition to the information that subjects bring with them about financial markets, design experience enriches their knowledge base through hands-on trading experience. Design experience may lead to common expectations, reducing behavioral uncertainty.
We investigate the interactive effects of subject pool and design experience on price deviations from fundamental value and forecast accuracy. Our data suggest that price bubbles moderate quickly when traders are more knowledgeable about financial markets and have design experience. Furthermore, this result holds when only a subset of traders are knowledgeable and experienced. In contrast, individual forecasts, on average, are not consistent with rational expectations predictions under any conditions. Hence, the rational expectations model may provide a good description of market behavior but a poor representation of average individual behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we provide a framework for our investigation, and in Section II we describe the experimental design. In Section III, we summarize the procedures to familiarize the reader with our experimental setting. In Section IV, we examine deviations in prices from fundamental value and make comparisons across markets.
We also examine individual forecasting behavior and the resultant implications for the rational expectations model. Lastly, Section V concludes the paper and provides direction for future investigations.
I. Framework
Several studies have examined the occurrence of speculative bubbles in experimental asset markets. Typically, a cohort of subjects trade certificates over a finite horizon. The certificates have a common dividend, determined at period end, based on a known, fixed probability distribution. At any point in time, fundamental value can be computed simply as the number of periods remaining times the expected dividend per period. Experimental results are quite robust.
In markets with inexperienced subjects (i.e., those without design experience), trading yields large bubbles in asset prices followed by crashes. This result holds even with traders who are knowledgeable about the functioning of financial markets. Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) and King, Smith, Williams, and Van Boening (1993) find evidence of bubbles and crashes using professional business people, including corporate executives and stock market dealers. When subjects have design experience, price bubbles are moderated.
Although asset prices eventually approach behavior consistent with rationality, empirical evidence does not suggest that individual forecasts, on average, are unbiased, even for experienced subjects (Williams 1987; Peterson 1993) . While these results may appear contradictory, economists have long recognized that agents have cognitive limitations (e.g., Simon 1955 Simon , 1959 and that aggregate rationality does not rely on the rationality of individuals in the market (Smith 1985; Camerer 1992) . Moreover, agents differ in ability and various economic models of behavior reflect such heterogeneity (e.g., Figlewski 1978; Haltiwanger and Waldman 1985) . Market behavior may approach rationality because a subset of agents is better able to trade effectively and exploit profit-making opportunities (e.g., Foster and Viswanathan 1996) .
Agents bring different knowledge sets to the marketplace, including facts stored in memory about the workings of financial markets. Cognitive psychologists use the term declarative knowledge to describe what is known about a particular domain (e.g., Anderson 1982 Anderson , 1987 . In this paper, we use subject pool to proxy for declarative knowledge. We identify two subject groups that bring distinctly different sets of knowledge to the experiment: senior business students and freshmen arts and sciences students who have declared majors outside of business and economics. The difference in educational background affects what is known about asset valuation and trading institutions. We investigate whether differences arise between markets with business and nonbusiness students.
Agents' declarative knowledge is enriched through hands-on experience. Trading experience provides agents with procedural knowledge (e.g., Anderson 1982 Anderson , 1987 , which refers to what is known about participating in financial markets. In our experiment, design experience gives subjects declarative knowledge about our specific trading institution as well as procedural knowledge. Subjects' store of declarative knowledge also facilitates their acquisition of procedural knowledge. Cognitive psychologists suggest that both types of knowledge are necessary for learning. In our markets, learning enables subjects to recognize capital gain opportunities and avoid capital loss. We investigate the interactive effect of subject pool and design experience on market and individual behavior. Specifically, we examine whether deviations in price from fundamental value decline and forecast accuracy improves in markets with business students who have design experience as compared to markets with other participants. In addition, we examine whether market prices converge to fundamental value asset prices when only a subset of market traders are knowledgeable and experienced. Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988, p. 1135) suggest that if this subset is large enough, price bubbles will dissipate.
II. Design
We conduct 14 experimental asset markets, each consisting of 15 periods. The experimental design and parameters (to be discussed subsequently) are summarized in Table 1 .
Traders in markets 1-6 are all inexperienced in that none had participated in an earlier bubbles market. Half are business students (markets 4-6), with the remaining participants coming from the pool of arts and sciences majors (markets 1-3). The business students all had successfully completed, at a minimum, two courses in accounting, two in economics, two in finance, and two in statistics. In addition, all business students had taken part in a required stock market trading competition. By comparison, the nonbusiness students had not enrolled in any business or economics course. These six markets provide a basis for comparison with subsequent markets and allow us to test for differences between subject pools.
Traders in markets 7-10 were all once-experienced in that all had participated in an earlier bubbles market, with markets 7-8 (9-10) consisting of nonbusiness (business) students. These 3 four markets allow us to examine the interactive effect of subject pool and design experience on deviations in market price from fundamental value and individual forecasting behavior.
In markets 11-14, we mix subjects from the two subject pools and vary the level of design experience. Four traders in each of markets 11-12 (13-14) were experienced nonbusiness (business) students. At least three of the four experienced traders were twice experienced in our bubbles markets. The remaining traders in markets 11-12 (13-14) were inexperienced business (nonbusiness) students. These four markets allow us to examine whether rational market behavior can be observed when only a subset of traders has a developed base of knowledge that relates to trading in our asset markets. Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of our subjects and documents differences across the two subject pools. The nonbusiness students were approximately 19 years of age and were in their first year of university education, whereas business students were, on average, over 22 and in their final year of undergraduate study. Less than ten percent of the nonbusiness students had any experience managing investments for themselves or others, while over forty percent of the business students had some actual investment management experience. The remaining rows of 4 the table report on students' performance in the experiment (discussed subsequently).
III. Procedures
At the beginning of each market session subjects received a set of instructions (included in the appendix) which an experimenter read aloud. Each market had 8 traders, with the exception of market 12 which had seven. The average compensation for the 111 participants in our markets was $32.31, which includes trading earnings, price prediction earnings, and a $3.00 bonus if on time for the session. The markets took approximately two hours to complete. The experimental parameters are summarized in Table 1 .
Prior to the commencement of trading, subjects were asked to predict average trading price for the coming year. They were informed that they would receive $0.25 for each prediction that was within ±$0.15 of the actual average price. Subjects were informed that if no transaction took place, the average price would be computed as the average of the last offers to buy and sell.
Price prediction earnings were paid to subjects at the conclusion of the session and these earnings were not added to the cash on hand used to finance trading in certificates.
All markets were organized as double oral auctions. Each trader was endowed with certificates and cash at the beginning of the trading session. There were four endowment classes with two traders receiving each endowment. The specific endowments are summarized in Table   1 . Traders were free to make verbal offers to buy or sell one certificate at a designated price at any time, and all offers were publicly announced and recorded. Outstanding offers stood until accepted or replaced by a better bid or ask price. Short sales were not permitted. All market years lasted 4 minutes. Subjects were informed that the market would consist of 15 years.
Uncertainty regarding the dividend remained throughout each market year until year-end when the experimenter publicly announced the dividend. All subjects within a session received 5 the same dividend for each certificate held. Subjects were aware of the four possible dividend values and that each was equally likely. After the experimenter announced the year's dividend, traders calculated their cash balance by multiplying the number of certificates held by the dividend and adding their earnings from certificate holdings to their cash on hand. Certificates and cash held at the end of a year were carried forward to the following market year. Endowments were 6 not reinitialized at any time.
At the end of the experiment subjects were paid in cash. During this time, they completed a post-experiment questionnaire. The purpose of the questionnaire was to collect general information about the subjects and how they viewed the experiment. 
IV. Results
Subsection IV.A provides descriptive findings of the market data. Subsection IV.B reports tests of the effects of subject pool and design experience on deviations in price from fundamental value. Subsection IV.C reports tests of whether individual forecasts, on average, are consistent with rationality.
A. Descriptives
Figures 1-14 show the mean certificate price, fundamental value, and volume of trading each period for each market. With inexperienced nonbusiness (markets 1-3) and business (markets 4-6) subjects, the mean price begins far below the fundamental value and then moves substantially above it, eventually crashing. With experience, the nonbusiness traders (markets 7-8) continue to generate price paths exhibiting large run-ups in price followed by crashes. A different pattern emerges for the experienced business students (markets 9-10). Although there is some evidence of bubbles early in trading, the price paths quickly settle close to the rational expectations equilibrium value. For the mixed markets (11-14), we observe moderate deviations in price from fundamental value (i.e., smaller than the deviations observed in the inexperienced markets). The data suggest that volume decreases with design experience, even in mixed markets.
Others have documented a decline in volume with experience (Smith, Suchanek, and Williams 1988; King, Smith, Williams, and Van Boening 1993; Porter and Smith 1995) . Our data also suggest that the variation in earnings between subjects decreases with experience. From the bottom portion of Table 2 , the discrepancy between the maximum and minimum earnings and the standard deviation of earnings declines markedly with design experience, including mixed markets. amplitude are commonly used to measure bubbles (e.g., Porter and Smith 1995) . Duration is the number of periods in which price increases relative to fundamental value. Formally where P is the mean price and f is the fundamental value in trading period t (t = 1, ..., 15).
Amplitude measures the magnitude of the bubble using the peak and trough price changes relative to fundamental value and is calculated as where the deviation in price from fundamental value each period is normalized by the total expected dividend value over the life of the certificate, f . Duration and amplitude both assume 1 risk neutrality.
The estimates reported in Table 3 suggest that duration and amplitude are reduced with design experience. When we compare inexperienced with experienced markets, the data indicate that bubbles moderate with experience, consistent with the results of earlier bubbles studies.
When we compare experienced with mixed markets, the data indicate that bubbles are tempered more when all traders are experienced.
In addition to duration and amplitude, we consider two other measures of price bubbles:
extreme overpricing and price decreases. These measures provide insight into bubbles and mispricing without imposing an assumption of risk neutrality. Extreme overpricing is the number of periods in which the average price exceeds the maximum possible price. Specifically, it is the number of market years for which where d is the maximum possible one-period dividend. One can hardly argue that an asset is max not mispriced when extreme overpricing is greater than zero. Price decreases is the number of periods in which the average price is lower than the preceding period, defined as
Because our markets have a finite horizon, price should decrease each period if behavior is rational, i.e., price decreases should be 14.
From Table 3 , extreme overpricing is observed only in markets with inexperienced subjects. In markets 1-6, average price exceeds the maximum price in six out of 90 periods.
These six observations are clearly inconsistent with rationality. The data also indicate that price decreases increase with experience and are greatest in markets with experienced business students (markets 9-10 and 13-14).
Lastly, Table 3 reports the average turnover in each treatment, defined as the total volume of trade normalized by the total shares outstanding. Consistent with earlier findings, turnover declines with experience.
B. Subject Pool and Design Experience
We perform analysis-of-variance (ANOVA) to formally test the effects of the treatment variables on deviations in price from fundamental value. The dependent variable is the normalized absolute deviation in price from fundamental value or |P -f |/f . The independent variables include t t t subject pool, design experience, and an interaction term. Initially, we focus on data from markets 1-10 because, in these markets, the treatment variables are manipulated between sessions. In addition, we exclude data from the first two periods because prices are rather erratic across these periods (see also Smith, Suchanek, and Williams 1988) .
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The ANOVA results, reported in Panel A of Table 4 , indicate that design experience and the interaction term are significant at p < 0.015. In light of the statistically significant interaction effect, we perform additional analysis. First we partition the data into two groups by subject pool and examine the simple effect of design experience on the normalized absolute deviation in price from fundamental value. We find that design experience is statistically significant for business students (F = 9.44, p = 0.003), but not for nonbusiness students (F = 0.01, p = 0.916). An inspection of cell means, reported in Panel B of Table 4 , indicates that price deviations diminish as business students gain experience.
Next we partition the data into two groups by experience and examine the simple effect of subject pool on the normalized absolute deviation in price from fundamental value. The results indicate that subject pool is statistically significant for experienced subjects (F = 23.46, p = 0.000), but not for inexperienced subjects (F = 0.37, p = 0.543). An inspection of cell means indicates that price deviations are smaller in markets with experienced business students than in those with experienced nonbusiness students.
Overall, the ANOVA results suggest that price bubbles are tempered as business students gain design experience, but not nonbusiness students. Business students bring declarative 9 knowledge to the experiment, which facilitates their acquisition of procedural knowledge.
Through experience, they are able to trade more effectively and improve their understanding of the determinants of asset value. Thus, asset prices become more efficient. Nonbusiness students, on the other hand, bring a relatively small base of knowledge to the experiment. For these subjects, hands-on trading experience initially provides for the acquisition of declarative knowledge and more repetition is necessary to acquire procedural knowledge (as compared to business students). Hence, price bubbles may not be moderated in markets with once-experienced nonbusiness students because subjects do not have enough repetition to provide for an enriched base of knowledge about trading.
Next, we investigate price deviations from fundamental value in mixed markets. We compare the mean normalized absolute price deviation in mixed markets with that in experienced markets, holding the subject pool of experienced traders constant. That is, we compare price deviations in markets 7-8 (9-10) with those in markets 11-12 (13-14) . The central issue is whether prices are as efficient in markets with mixed traders as in markets with experienced traders. Because price bubbles were tempered in markets 9-10, we are primarily interested in markets that include experienced business students.
The mean price deviation per treatment is reported in A noteworthy finding is that price deviations from fundamental value do not appear to increase substantially with the presence of a subset of inexperienced traders, representing 43-50 percent of each mixed market. In fact, price deviations decrease significantly in mixed markets with experienced nonbusiness students. This result may arise because nonbusiness students require more repetition to acquire procedural knowledge. Recall that at least three out of four experienced subjects in the mixed markets are twice experienced. The data from both sets of mixed markets suggest that the subset of experienced traders largely determines the behavior of asset prices.
Lastly, for the mixed markets, we compared the earnings of experienced and inexperienced subjects. In markets 11-12, experienced nonbusiness students earned, on average, $2.77 more than inexperienced business students. The difference is not significant using a parametric t-test (t = -1.72, p = 0.109, two tailed) and significant using a nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (z = -2.20, p = 0.028, two tailed). The difference between parametric and nonparametric results arises because the top earner in market 12 was an inexperienced, business student. In markets 13-14, experienced business students earned, on average, $7.30 more than inexperienced nonbusiness students. The difference is significant using parametric and
nonparametric tests (t = -3.84, p = 0.002 and z = -3.05, p = 0.002). Hence, experienced business subjects were able to exploit profit-making opportunities at the expense of inexperienced subjects.
C. Individual Forecasting Behavior
We perform ANOVA to investigate whether experienced business students are superior forecasters. The dependent variable is the normalized forecast error, defined as where P is the mean price in trading period t (t = 3, ..., 15) and F is trader i's forecast of the t i,t 10 period t mean price. The independent variables include subject pool, design experience, and an interaction term. As before, we initially focus on data from markets 1-10. The ANOVA results indicate that none of the independent variables has a statistically significant effect at conventional levels.
We also examine the accuracy of subjects' forecasts by testing whether price forecasts are unbiased estimates of realized price. For each market set, we use ordinary-least-squares (OLS) to estimate the following equation:
where t = 3, ..., 15 and e is a mean zero random error term. In addition, for the mixed markets, i,t we estimate (6) for the subsets of traders with and without experience. seven out of eight cases, the null hypothesis of rationality is rejected at the 1% significance level.
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Nothing in the data suggests that forecast accuracy is better for business students or improves with experience. Keane and Runkle (1990) argue that many tests of forecast accuracy are flawed because they do not properly model the covariance structure of errors. First, errors may be serially correlated because of lags in data availability. This problem is not a concern to us because we use an experimental approach, which allows us to control the flow of information. Second, shocks in the aggregate economy may lead to correlation in errors across individuals. Our data suggest that subjects are not proficient in predicting crashes so that such a shock could lead to correlated errors across individuals. In order to assess the sensitivity of our results, we estimate (6) separately for each subject in our study, with and without correction for heteroskedasticity.
Overall, we reject the null hypothesis of unbiasedness for approximately half of the subjects. We are unable to detect any evidence that forecast accuracy is affected by subject pool or design experience; however, our data suggest that some subjects are clearly better forecasters. Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) and Peterson (1993) also report that some subjects had superior forecasting ability.
Next we test for serial correlation in forecast errors. If the current forecast fully incorporates information from past forecast errors, we should not be able to reject the hypothesis that $=0 when estimating the regression
(8) Subsequently, we estimate (7) for each subject in our study and find some evidence that serial correlation in forecast errors diminishes with design experience. In markets 1-6 (7-10), we are able to reject the hypothesis that $=0 for 16 out of 48 (1 out of 32) subjects or 33.33 percent (3.13 percent). A test of differences in proportions indicates a statistically significant difference at p < 0.05. Nothing in the data, however, suggests that subject pool affects the serial correlation in forecast errors.
Finally, we investigate whether the formation of price expectations can be modeled as adaptive. Others (e.g., Williams 1987; Peterson 1993) suggest that the learning process can be characterized as such. A forecast is updated to adapt to previous forecast error giving the following specification for the forecast generating process:
Assuming risk neutrality, expectations are adaptive if " = -E(d) and 0 < $ < 1, where E(d) is the expected value of the dividend. Table 8 reports OLS estimates of (8) for each market set. The tratios shown in brackets under the constant and slope estimates test the null hypothesis that "=-E(d) and $=1, respectively. In most cases, these null hypotheses are rejected. In addition, we are able to reject the hypothesis that $=0 in all eight cases at the 1% significance level. Taken as a whole, our results suggest that forecasts are adaptive, though a persistent bias is observed (i.e.,
">-E(d)).

V. Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates the effects of subject pool and design experience on market and individual behavior. We test whether the interactive effects of knowledge and experience temper price bubbles and improve forecasting ability. In markets with experienced business students, price run ups are modest and dissipate quickly. Through their education, these students have developed a base of knowledge about the functioning of financial markets, which facilitates their acquisition of procedural knowledge. Nonbusiness students, on the other hand, are less knowledgeable about financial markets and require more repetition to gain an understanding of the fundamental determinants of asset value. Different subject pools can lead to different results under identical conditions. Hence, theorists are advised to consider agent type in the development of models that characterize economic behavior.
We find that price bubbles moderate quickly when only a subset of traders are knowledgeable and experienced. This subset of traders, in general, generates greater profit and appears to drive prices toward fundamental asset value. Our results suggest that markets may operate efficiently even when novice traders make up half of the market.
The results also indicate that individual forecasts are not consistent with the predictions of the rational expectations model. On average, forecasts are biased and serially correlated, though some individuals appear to have superior forecasting ability. We provide some evidence that the correlation in forecast errors diminishes with design experience; however, forecasting ability does not appear to be affected by subject pool. Our evidence suggests, in general, that individuals are not very good forecasters.
In sum, our results suggest that efficient market outcomes may be observed with only a subset of knowledgeable and experienced traders. Moreover, market efficiency does not hinge on the ability of traders to produce rational price predictions. We can observe rational market outcomes with "irrational" market participants.
1. For a discussion of these and other episodes of extreme price adjustments, the reader is referred to the Symposium on Bubbles in the Spring 1990 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives (vol. 4, no. 2).
2. Design experience refers to participation in an earlier asset market with like conditions.
3. Other studies (e.g., King, Smith, Williams, and Van Boening 1993; Smith and Porter 1995) maintain the same cohort of traders across inexperienced and experienced markets. Researchers have suggested that replication with the same cohort of subjects may be necessary to create a market with common expectations in which price bubbles are eliminated. We do not maintain this requirement in our markets. In naturally occurring markets, the composition of the market is free to change continually.
4. At the conclusion of each experimental session, we asked subjects whether they had ever (1) traded securities for themselves or others and (2) participated in the management of an investment portfolio.
5. We randomly determined the dividend before each set of markets was conducted (1-6, 7-10, and 11-14). The preselected sequence was used for each market in a set. Cason and Friedman (1996) discuss the benefits of using a preselected sequence.
6. At the end of each year, an experimenter circled the room to review each subject's record sheet to ensure that certificates and cash on hand (carried forward to the next period) were correct.
7. Questionnaire responses suggest that subjects found the experiment interesting and the monetary incentives motivating. Subjects were asked to respond on a seven-point scale as to how interesting they found the experiment. The scale endpoints were 1 for not very interesting and 7 for very interesting. The mean response was 5.86. Subjects also were asked about the amount of money earned in the experiment where 1 was a nominal amount and 7 was a considerable amount. The mean response was 5.26.
8. The average market price typically begins well below the fundamental value and adjusts upward quickly in the second and, sometimes, the third period (refer to Figures 1-14) . The results, however, are unaffected if data from all 15 periods are included in the analyses.
9. We also performed nonparametric, Kruskal-Wallis tests to examine the simple effects of design experience and subject pool on normalized absolute price deviations. The results are similar to those reported in the text.
10. We exclude data from the first two periods to allow subjects to orient themselves to market behavior. The forecasting results reported in this subsection, however, are unaffected if data from all 15 periods are included in the analyses.
Endnotes
11. Diagnostic tests, including the Breusch-Pagan- Godfrey (Breusch and Pagan 1979; Godfrey 1978) and ARCH (Engle 1982) tests, indicated significant heteroskedasticity in the regression residual. We used White's (1980) heteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrix estimation to correct for an unknown form of heteroskedasticity and inferences were unaffected.
12. Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) point out that the F-statistic tests whether forecasts are Nash-rational, a weaker condition than Muthian-rational.
13. We also performed the analysis using normalized forecast error and results were unaffected.
APPENDIX
The experimental instructions follow. Differences between markets are denoted in parentheses for markets 7-10 and in brackets for markets 11-14.
General Instructions
This experiment is concerned with the economics of market decision-making. We are going to simulate a market in which you will buy and sell certificates in a sequence of 15 market years. You also will attempt to predict the average trading price each year. Based on your trading decisions and predictive abilities, you are able to generate profits, which will be paid to you in cash at the conclusion of this experiment.
Attached to these materials you will find 15 information and record sheets, one for each market year, and a price prediction sheet. Please refer to these sheets while going through the instructions.
Specific Instructions Trading
Your trading profits come from two sources--from collecting dividends on all certificates you hold at the end of a year and from buying and selling certificates. During each market year you are free to purchase or sell as many certificates as you wish, provided you follow the rules below. For each certificate you hold at the end of a year you will receive a dividend of $1. Sales from your certificate holdings increase your cash on hand by the amount of the sale price. Similarly, purchases reduce your cash on hand by the amount of the purchase price. Thus you can gain or lose money on the purchase and resale of certificates.
At the beginning of the first market year you are provided with holdings of certificates and cash on hand. Note that different traders may have different holdings. Your holdings are recorded on the endowment row of the information and record sheet for year 1. This is your private information. Do not reveal this information to anyone because it could affect the amount of money that you are able to earn for participating in this experiment.
You may sell your initial endowment of certificates or you may hold them. If you hold a certificate, then you receive a dividend at the end of the year. Notice therefore that for each certificate you hold, you can earn during the year at least the dividend amount. You earn this amount if you do not sell the certificate during the year. Your holdings of certificates at the end of the year are carried forward to the beginning of the next year.
You may use your initial endowment of cash on hand to purchase certificates or you may hold this amount. Purchases decrease your cash on hand by the amount of the purchase price and sales increase your cash on hand by the amount of the sales price. Dividends also increase your cash on hand. Your holdings of cash at the end of the year are carried forward to the beginning of the next year. Your cash on hand at the end of year 15 is yours to keep.
Dividends
Whether the dividend you receive from the certificates you hold is $1.20, $0.56, $0.16, or $0.00 ($0.90, $0.42, $0.12, or $0.12) [$1.06, $0.48, $0.18, or $0 .00] is determined randomly. Each dividend amount has an equal chance of being paid. The amounts have been determined previously. At the end of each year, the experimenter will announce the dividend for the year.
Predicting Prices
At the beginning of each year, you will attempt to predict the average trading price for the upcoming year. You will receive $0.25 for each prediction that is within ± $0.15 of the actual price. The actual price is computed as the sum of the transactions prices for the year divided by the number of transactions. If no transactions take place during the year, the actual price is computed as the sum of the last buy and sell prices divided by two. The experimenter will announce the actual price at the end of each year.
Market Organization
The market for certificates is organized as follows. The market will be conducted in a series of 15 years. Each market year lasts four minutes.
Anyone wishing to purchase a certificate is free to raise his or her hand and make a verbal bid to buy one certificate at a specified price, and anyone with certificates to sell is free to accept or not accept the bid. Likewise, anyone wishing to sell a certificate is free to raise his or her hand and make a verbal offer to sell one certificate at a specified price. Please wait until the experimenter calls on you to make a bid or offer. When you are called on, please announce your trader number followed by your bid or offer. If you wish to accept an outstanding bid or offer, shout out accept to buy or accept to sell. In this case, you do not need to raise your hand and wait for the experimenter to call on you.
If a bid or offer is accepted, a binding contract has been closed for a single certificate, and the contracting parties will record the transaction on their Information and Record Sheets. Any ties in bids or acceptances will be resolved by random choice.
Trading and Recording Rules
(1) All transactions are for one certificate at a time. After each of your sales or purchases you must record the TRANSACTION PRICE in the appropriate column of your information and record sheet depending on the nature of the transaction. The first transaction is recorded on row 1, and succeeding transactions are recorded on subsequent rows. 
Price Prediction and Recording Rules
(1) Prior to the beginning of each year, you attempt to predict the average trading price for the upcoming year. Record your prediction on the row corresponding to the upcoming year in column (3) of your price prediction sheet. The experimenters will walk around the room to ensure that your prediction is recorded before the year begins.
(2) At the end of the year, the experimenters will announce the average trading price. Record this amount on the appropriate row in column (4) of your price prediction sheet. (4) At the conclusion of the experiment, sum up your price prediction earnings and record the total on row 16.
(5) At the bottom of the price prediction sheet, compute your total experimental earnings. This amount equals your cash on hand at the end of year 15 plus your total price prediction earnings plus your bonus for being on time (if received). This amount will be paid to you in cash. 
TOTAL EXPERIMENTAL EARNINGS
Cash on hand at the end of year 15
Total price prediction earnings Bonus for being on time ($3.00 or $0.00)
Total Experimental Earnings Post-Experiment Questionnaire
This questionnaire is designed to collect general information. Such information may help us better understand differences found between participants in this experiment. 
6. Have you ever participated in a market experiment where you actively trade with other participants? (check one) yes _____ no _____ 7. Have you ever traded securities for yourself or others? (check one) yes _____ no _____ 8. Have you ever participated in the management of an investment portfolio? (check one) yes _____ no _____ 9. Compared to the amount of money available to you from alternative sources, how would you characterize the amount of money earned for participating in this experiment? (circle the appropriate number)
10. How would you characterize your attitude toward risk while participating in the market experiment? (circle the appropriate number)
11. How would you characterize the difficulty/ease of predicting the price each year? (circle the appropriate number) Notes: Duration is the number of periods in which price increases relative to fundamental value. Amplitude is a measure of the magnitude of the bubble based on the trough and peak price changes relative to fundamental value. Extreme overpricing is the number of periods in which the average price exceeds the maximum possible price. Price decreases is the number of periods in which the average price is lower than the preceding period. Turnover is the normalized volume of trade. Notes: OLS standard errors are reported below coefficient estimates. The F-statistic is for a joint test of the hypothesis that the intercept is zero and slope is one. *** denotes significance at the 1% level. ** denotes significance at the 5% level. * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
